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‘Fair work’ and the modernisation of Australian labour standards: A case of institutional 
plasticity entrenching deepening wage inequalitycademic  
Words: 10,069 
Abstract  
Australia was long recognised for its relatively compressed wage structure. From the 
1940s to the 1970s this was associated with a comprehensive regime of ‘award 
based’ minimum wages. Since the 1980s this has been subjected to comprehensive 
‘modernisation’. After three decades of reform and in the most supportive economic 
environment in the OECD, Australian wage inequality has deepened. Although 
multiple political-economic forces have been at play, the evolution of Australia’s 
labour standards regime is an example of ‘institutional plasticity’ whereby the 
purpose and operations of wage-setting institutions not only evolves but can actually 
be inverted over time.  
 
Concern about deepening labour market inequality has shifted from the margins to the 
mainstream of public policy in recent years. In their combined briefing for the G20 Labour 
Ministers meeting of September 2014 the International Labor Organisation (ILO), OECD and 
World Bank urged world leaders to confront the problem of inequality (ILO, OECD and 
World Bank 2014). The connection between wages and productivity was of particular 
concern: wage growth had lagged productivity improvements for too long (ILO, OECD and 
World Bank 2014: 1, 6). The three international organisations argued that unless dramatic 
change occurred, inequality would choke off growth strong enough to reduce 
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unemployment. This shift is yet to be embraced by political leaders. The Declaration of the 
G20 Labour and Employment Ministers (2014) issued after consideration of this briefing 
endorsed many of its specific policy proposals concerning matters like gender discrimination 
and youth unemployment, but ignored the over-riding problem of inequality.  
 
This distance between international agencies’ growing distributional concerns and 
governments’ reluctance to embrace them is significant. Political leaders, it seems, are at 
best committed to persisting with a narrow ‘labour market modernisation’ agenda: 
ameliorating specific ‘equity issues’ but sticking with the core features of what is essentially 
a neoliberal-inspired ‘labour market flexibility’ policy regime. The underlying vision is to help 
individuals achieve self-reliance through bargaining at workplace and enterprise level. 
Without a decisive change in direction the current trajectory of economic development 
based on deepening inequality is likely to deliver more of the same. What will this mean in 
practice? In particular, to what extent, if any, can ‘modernised’ labour law redress rising 
wage inequality? 
 
This article addreses these questions by drawing on the renewed research interest in the 
role of industrial relations institutions in addressing wage inequality to contribute an 
analysis of recent Australian developments. Wage inequality has been increasing in many 
developed countries, including Australia. Comparative research shows that minimum wage 
setting and collective bargaining procedures play a determining role in moderating or 
accelerating inequality. (Bosch, Mayhew and Gautie 2010; Hayter and Weinberg 2011; 
Grimshaw, Bosch and Rubery 2014).  
 
3 
 
Institutional frameworks vary across countries and across time. Cross-country comparisons 
show that wage inequality is largest in countries with no or low minimum wages and 
restricted collective bargaining coverage while wage dispersion is lowest in countries with 
high collective bargaining coverage. Within countries, institutions may decline over time and 
be supplanted by new ones. More commonly, institutions adapt (Baccaro and Howell 2011; 
Streeck and Thelen 2005; Thelen 2014) and may even invert their functions as the 
underlying political coalitions that create them shift (Thelen 2004). Two countries that 
illustrate this latter process in the industrial relations arena well are Germany and Australia. 
Germany’s transformation – through the steady decline of collective bargaining and the 
adoption of a national minimum wage in 2014 – has been well documented (Bosch 2015a; 
Bosch, Mayhew and Gautie 2010; Grimshaw, Bosch and Rubery 2014; Schulten and Bispinck 
2015). The changing interplay of Australia’s minimum wage setting mechanisms and 
collective bargaining institutions and their association with deepening wage inequality has 
received less attention. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, the evidence of growing wage 
inequality internationally and in Australia is reviewed. Following that, the relationship 
between wage inequality and industrial relations institutions is explored. Having established 
the connection between wage inequality and collective bargaining and minimum wage 
setting institutions, the article briefly considers different approaches to understanding 
institutional change. The main part of the article provides a case study of recent Australian 
experiences of how ‘modernisation’ of labour standards has coincided with deepening wage 
inequality despite ostensible continuity of institutional arrangements committed to 
maintaining equity in the wages system. The paper concludes that if international agencies’ 
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newfound concerns with deepening wage inequality are to be addressed policies involving 
more than ‘neoliberalism with a human face’ are needed.  
 
Deepening wage inequality 
In examining the level of wage inequality, it is useful to look at both the number of low pay 
employees and the dispersion of earnings. The OECD defines ‘low pay employees’ as those 
who earn less than two-thirds of median hourly earnings. Amongst English-speaking 
countries Australia has traditionally had one of the lowest levels of such employment 
(Buchanan, Dymski, et al. 2013a). Figure 1 summarises trends in the proportion of 
employees falling into this category between 1993 and 2013 for six countries: Australia, 
Germany, Japan, Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States. As is clear from the 
figure, while Australia used to differ significantly from the USA and UK it is rapidly 
approaching these countries’ norms of low paid work. Of the countries shown, it has 
experienced the largest increase (albeit from the lowest base), followed closely by Germany. 
The OECD series is missing data for France, Denmark and Sweden but other sources 
(Eurostat 2010; Mason and Salverda 2010) show that wage inequality, based on this 
measure, is lower than the six countries shown in Figure 1 and has been more stable in 
these countries over the similar period.  
 
Insert figure 1 approximately here 
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In most countries, workers at the bottom of the earnings distribution are also drifting 
further from the middle and the top of the earnings distribution. Figure 2 shows the ratio of 
the fifth earnings decile (or the median wage) to the first earnings decile for the same six 
countries as in Figure 1. Again the results show that Australia has the largest increase, with 
Germany second and Japan, Korea and the United Kingdom actually showing declines in the 
5:1 ratios over that period. When the full distribution is considered, however, the results 
more consistently show an increase in dispersion. In the USA and UK, researchers such as 
Krugman (2009: 37-56, 124-152) and Atkinson (2007) have noted that a ‘great compression’ 
in the distribution of wage related income between 1940s and 1970s has given way to the 
‘great dispersion’ occurring since that time.  
 
Insert figure 2 approximately here 
 
Almost identical regularities are apparent in Australia. In the three decades prior to the mid-
1970s earnings inequality, as signified by the ratio of middle to top male income earners, 
was stable (Leigh 2005: s58-s70 , 2013: 30-45). Since the late 1970s, earnings inequality has 
risen significantly. Data on the situation from 2002 to 2012 reveals this trend has continued 
(Fair Work Commission 2013, chart 6.5). Like most other OECD countries deepening 
inequality has also occurred in the functional distribution of income. After surging in the 
later 1970s, over the last three decades wages’ share of GDP has fallen 10 percentage 
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points, with the bulk of productivity gains from this period going to business (Buchanan, 
Dymski, Froud, Johal and Williams 2013a).  
 
Institutions and wage inequality 
Wage inequality is an artefact of both market and institutional forces. The interaction between the 
two is usefully conceived as the forces of labour supply (e.g. skills and education levels) and labour 
demand (e.g. technology) setting the limits within which institutional forces ultimately determine 
actual wage outcomes.i A recent careful and empirically rich analysis of how these factors have 
interacted to shape wage outcomes in several leading advanced capitalist countries over the last 
century is provided by Picketty (2014: 304-335). As he puts it: ‘Technology and skills set limits within 
which most wages must be fixed.’ (Picketty 2014: 333) Institutions are important for determining the 
wage levels and rates that actually prevail in a particular country at a particular time (Picketty 2014: 
313). As Picketty notes: the main problem with marginalist economic orthodoxy ‘is quite simply that 
it fails to explain the diversity of wage distributions we observe in different countries at different 
times. ... In order understand the dynamics of wage inequality, we must introduce other factors, 
such as the institutions and rules that govern the operation of the labour market in each society’ 
(Picketty 2014: 308)ii. 
These factors have been the focus of a growing literature on the connections and outcomes of wage 
determination. Freeman (2008: 20) presents evidence at a very broad level, finding that 
‘countries that rely on institutions to set wages and working conditions’ exhibit a lower 
dispersion of earnings (as measured by the ratio of the pay of the 9th decile relative to the 
1st decile) compared to those which rely more on ‘market mechanisms’. In addition to such 
cross-sectional comparisons, historical evidence demonstrates a similar effect (Machin and 
Manning 1994; Minns and Rizov 2015).  
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Bosch (2015a) argues that collective bargaining penetration has a larger effect on (reducing) 
wage inequality than minimum wages. Using evidence from European Union countries, he 
shows a strong, negative correlation between bargaining coverage and shares of low-wage 
employment. Hayter and Weinberg (2011: 141) present similar data (using the 90:10 wage 
ratio and bargaining coverage) for OECD countries and reach the same conclusion.iii The 
data in Figure 3 confirms the apparent relationship between collective bargaining coverage, 
the incidence of low pay workers, and the earnings ratio for low-income earners for the six 
countries shown in Figures 1 and 2, Sweden, France and Denmark. In the graph, collective 
bargaining coverage is shown on the x axis, the incidence of low pay workers on the y axis, 
and the size of the bubbles represents the 5:1 ratio. The figure shows the US, the country 
with the lowest collective bargaining coverage and the higher incidence of low pay workers, 
in the top left and Denmark and France, the countries with the highest collective bargaining 
coverage and the lowest incidence of low pay, diagonally opposite.  
Insert Figure 3 approximately here.  
 
Arguments that collective bargaining coverage is more important than a minimum wage 
assume that the minimum wage is a single rate set below the low-wage threshold and that 
collective agreements contain multiple rates producing higher pay to reward workers for 
additional skills, responsibilities and/or discomforts. They also assume that collective 
bargaining takes place at the industry or sectoral level, and there is some kind of extension 
mechanism in place. Why is this the case? 
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Bosch (2015a) uses Sengenberger’s (1994) distinction between protective and participative 
standards to argue that to limit wage inequality the state must do more than provide strong 
protective standards through directly regulating minimum wages or maximum hours; strong 
participative standards are necessary to promote bargaining that will establish industry-
based pay floors that sit well above the minimum wage (where one exists). Hence, the level 
of collective bargaining is crucial: ‘national or industry-wide collective agreements are 
significantly more inclusive than company agreements because the standards they set are 
extended to employees with weak bargaining power, particularly those working in small 
firms’ (Bosch 2015a: 58). Wallerstein (1999), Golden and Londregan (2006) and Hayter and 
Weinberg (2011) find that the higher the degree of centralisation of bargaining, the lower 
the wage dispersion. Changes to the bargaining level within countries can also impact on 
wage inequality, as Kahn (1998) has shown for Norway, Hibbs (1990) for Sweden and Kristal 
and Cohen (2007) for Israel.  
 
What Bosch, Mayhew and Gautie (2010: 91) term the inclusiveness of pay-setting systems 
(the extent to which the pay of workers with strong bargaining power determines the pay of 
workers with weaker bargaining power) is also relevant. In their words (2010: 92), 
The most inclusive systems use centralized and coordinated national collective 
bargaining agreements to extend the wage gains of the most powerful, generally 
unionised, workers to those workers with less bargaining power, especially less-
skilled and non-union workers. 
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In Australia, even though this process historically occurred through the arbitrated award 
system rather than collective bargaining per se, it nonetheless relied on strong unions in key 
sectors (particularly engineering, construction and transport) setting labour standards 
through informal collective agreements that subsequently provided the basis for award 
standards. This was the quasi-extension mechanism (OECD 2004: 147; Schmitt et al 2008) by 
which ‘the strong protected the weak’ (Hughes 1973).  
 
Industrial relations systems with procedures to extend collective bargaining outcomes to 
the non-union sector also exhibit lower wage inequality (Hayter and Weinberg 2011). There 
are various mechanisms that may sustain inclusive arrangements, depending on the 
national context: high union density, high employer association membership and/or state 
support (Bosch, Mayhew and Gautie 2010: 95-99). Whatever the basis of the inclusiveness 
of pay setting arrangements, maintaining extension provisions, and limiting options for 
employers to exit such provisions, is crucial to limiting wage dispersion (Bosch, Mayhew and 
Gautie 2010: 92). Low youth wages (as in the Netherlands), German ‘mini-jobs’, ‘posted’ 
migrant workers covered by the terms of their origin country, labour hire and temporary 
employment are examples of exit arrangements.  
 
Grimshaw, Bosch and Rubery (2014) further interrogate the interplay between collective 
bargaining and minimum wage setting, and its effect on wage inequality. They find four 
factors are critical to shaping how industrial relations institutions shape wage outcomes: 
1. The level of the minimum wage relative to the base rates in collective agreements 
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2. The degree of social dialogue in minimum wage setting 
3. The influence of competing government policy objectives on setting the minimum 
wage 
4. Compliance 
In examining the impact of minimum wage changes on earnings up the distribution (the so-
called ‘ripple effect), the authors emphasise the central role of union actions to ‘defend a 
wage grid of coefficients indexed to the base rate’ (Grimshaw et al 2014: 489). Longer-
lasting ripples persist when unions are effective in maintaining such grids relative to the 
minimum wage. It is one of the reasons why France has maintained lower levels of pay 
inequity. In contrast, where collective bargaining rules do not maintain a linkage between 
the minimum wage and higher wage rates, rises in minimum wages can co-exist with rising 
wage inequality.  
 
Australia’s situation is probably closest internationally to Germany, which following the 
introduction of minimum wages in the last ten years (at the industry level in 2007, then a 
statutory national minimum wage in 2015) also now exhibits a hybrid system featuring 
direct state intervention and bargaining (Bosch 2015a: 61). But the participative standards 
in Australia are much weaker, with a prohibition on industry or pattern bargaining, no 
extension provisions and other multiple restrictions on unions’ activities. In Germany, 
legislation allows ‘minimum wages that can be differentiated by skill levels’ but the entire 
wages grid is not extended to all employees (Bosch 2015b). In Australia, the wages grid 
embedded in award classification scales are extended to all employees but are much weaker 
in practice – a matter explored in more detail below.  
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How institutions change 
The growing literature on institutional change, and especially that concerned with 
institutional plasticity, helps explain why Australia, along with Germany, exhibits growing 
wage inequality despite ostensibly maintaining robust collective bargaining and minimum 
wage setting institutions. This literature has emerged in reaction to the varieties of 
capitalism (VOC) school. The greatest strength of the VOC literature is that it highlights there 
is not a single path for successful market economies. Its key problem is the assumption of 
‘path dependence’. As is well known it posits such trajectories take one of two ideal typical 
forms: so-called ‘liberal market’ and ‘coordinated market’ trajectories. These are ensembles 
of complementary product and factor market arrangements. A growing number of 
researchers are critical of its assumptions about institutional stability (and especially 
assumed complementary) amongst arrangements shaping the evolution of product, labour 
and capital markets. Common to these researchers is a concern with understanding why 
change is simultaneously untidy but also often coherent in nature. These VOC critics have 
devoted careful attention to understanding how institutions evolve and mutate to help 
explain the considerable evidence towards convergence in national economies (Baccaro and 
Howell 2011; Howell and Givan 2011). This convergence involves more than arriving at ‘the 
one best way’ implicit in market and neo-liberal discourse. As noted earlier, within a market 
society there are ongoing challenges arising from the changing conditions of supply and 
demand in product and factor markets (Botwinick 1994, Picketty 2014: 310-313). While 
changes in market prices clearly play a role in guiding necessary adjustments, a host of other 
adjustment – or more precisely governance - mechanisms exist (Crouch 2005: 101 - 150). In 
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addition to markets, arrangements arising from the state and civil society also shape the 
evolution of market societies. These can be combined in a wide variety of ways to achieve 
change as established arrangements lose their effectiveness in new circumstances. 
 
Thelen (2009: 489) has identified four modes of institutional change: 
 displacement (when existing institutions are removed, often replaced by new 
arrangements), 
 layering (where a new institution is introduced to coexist alongside existing ones),  
 drift (when sectoral growth occurs outside the reach of existing institutions), and  
 conversion, which arises when the rules of existing institutions are reinterpreted. 
 
Examples of displacement are rare. In the field of industrial relations the New Zealand 
Employment Contracts Act of the early 1990s, which completely replaced a system of 
conciliation and arbitration, is a good example. As Hall and Thelen (2009) note, only with 
displacement (what they refer to as reform) is there a transparent re-writing of institutional 
functions. Institutional change more commonly involves the other three forms. Of particular 
importance is what Thelen calls conversion or others refer to as plasticity. For Baccaro and 
Howell (2011: 525) this involves ‘a mutation on the function and meaning of existing 
institutions, producing different practices and consequences in new contexts’. As Deeg and 
Jackson (2006: 157) put it: the research challenge is to understand institutions that ‘may 
“appear” stable due to persistence of formal institutional differences, but still undergo 
substantial functional change’. Howell and Givan (2011: 235) identify three ways in which 
change of this nature can occur: mutation, changing balance between primary and 
secondary institutions and opting out. Mutation involves an established institution taking on 
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a new role. Also described as reinterpretation (Hall and Thelen 2009), it involves a refraction 
(or in extreme cases inversion) of the function of institutions without any formal changes. A 
good example is the expansion of the scope of the role of Works Councils in Germany to 
circumvent the provisions of collective bargaining agreements (Hall and Thelen 2009: 19). 
Second, the balance of influence between primary and secondary institutions may change, 
such that a formerly secondary institution becomes more influential. Third, actors may 
develop the ability to opt out of the regulation created by established institutional 
arrangements. Hall and Thelen (2009) described this as defection. The erosion of collective 
bargaining coverage is the archetypal example. In Australia all four forms of change have 
ensured rising wage inequality has coexisted with a modernised labour standards regime 
purporting to provide institutional continuity concerned with labour market fairness.  
 
Modernising Australian labour standards: The shift from inclusive awards to exclusive 
enterprise agreements  
 
With roots stretching back to colonial times, the distinctive antipodean institution of 
arbitrated awards to govern wages and conditions is as old as an independent Australia. The 
depression of the 1890s hit the Australian colonies hard. As the crisis deepened over the 
decade employers confronted an increasingly self-confident union movement in the key 
pastoral, mining and waterfront sectors (Gollan 1960). While business, supported by the 
state, won the disputes convincingly, the upheavals excited deep political concern. Central 
to public debates concerning federation and independence from Britain at this time was 
how the new nation should position itself in the world economy. Those in the export sector, 
primarily pastoralists, aspired to a regime based on ‘free trade’ in product markets and 
14 
 
‘freedom of contract’ in the labour market (Macintyre 1985: 51-57). Progressive liberal 
journalists and lawmakers, along with a growing group of employers interested in building 
local manufacturing – coalesced around a different program: ‘the new protection.’ The key 
elements of this were the ‘tariff’ to support secondary industry, ‘white Australia’ 
immigration policy to limit competition in the labour market and compulsory conciliation 
and arbitration to ‘prevent the rude strike and barbarous lockout’ (Higgins 1922) and ensure 
the fair distribution of work related earnings.  
 
A new Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration was created as one of the first 
Acts of the new federal parliament in 1904. Its primary goal was more effective prevention 
and settlement of disputes. As the system evolved, one of its defining practices was to 
register industrial awards governing the parties or potential parties to a dispute. These 
could be made either by consent or arbitration. They specified minimum wages and 
conditions which, in theory, promoted industrial harmony. In settling awards the Court was 
guided by the common law principle of treating like case alike. This way the notion of ‘fair 
comparability’ or ‘pattern agreements’- a defining principle of industrial relations systems 
the world over - received judicial force in Australia through the doctrine of ‘comparative 
wage justice’ (DEIR 1984; Hancock and Richardson 2004).  
 
As the system matured the notion of fair pay relativities, as embodied in awards, became 
central not just to disputes management but to economic management more generally 
(Isaac and Macintyre 2004: 5). The system was really an amalgam: collective bargaining 
embedded within a conciliation and arbitration system. Industrial tribunals shaped relations 
between the parties and codified principles that governed both their conduct and 
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substantive pay and conditions as fluctuations in growth and struggles over productivity 
dividends evolved (Hancock and Richardson 2004; Laffer 1962). After the crisis of the 1930s 
the system became integral to a more advanced liberal collectivist regime of Keynesian 
inspired macroeconomic management and an expanding welfare state – both conscious 
products of a comprehensive program of post-war reconstruction (Macintyre 2015: 
especially 441 – 464). With the onset of full employment a dynamic developed by the late 
1960s through to the early 1980s whereby collectively-bargained industry deals in pace-
setting sectors would be presented for registration as consent awards. These awards in turn 
prompted industrial tribunals to realign relativities across the system. In this way the gains 
of the strong were shared with the weak, resulting in a much more compressed wage 
structure than other English-speaking countries (Brown et al. 1980). So successful were 
these wage campaigns that employees’ share of GDP increased around 10 percentage 
points of GDP from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s (Buchanan, Dymski, et al 2013b; 
Cupper 1976; Yerbury 1980). Moreover the centralised system was also able to 
accommodate a period of wage restraint during the first half of the 1980s, as part of an 
Accord brokered by the newly-elected Labor Government to control inflation and 
unemployment and restore economic growth – problems that emerged as a result of the 
world economic downturn in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
 
This incremental institutional evolution did not occur in a vacuum. Over the course of the 
twentieth century the award system gradually expanded to encompass a range of 
industries, occupations and issues. Initially the system operated to buttress managerial 
prerogatives by dealing only with ‘industrial matters’ narrowly defined (i.e. wages and 
conditions) for ‘industries’ characterised as involving only ‘manual’ occupations. By the 
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middle of the 1980s all traces of these early confines had disappeared. A series of High 
Court and peak tribunal decisions ensured that any worker in any sector could be included 
in the system and any matter potentially connected to work (including anything associated 
with ‘workplace change’) was potentially an ‘industrial’ matter. As a result there was no 
legal limit to the issues concerning, or realms of, the labour market encompassed in the 
system (Wright 1995: 183- 209).  
 
It is important to appreciate, however, the informal realities surrounding the system. 
Implicitly it built around the breadwinner model of employment – i.e. a full time male 
employee engaged on an ongoing (i.e. ‘permanent’) basis (Watson et al 2003). Throughout 
its entire existence higher waged workers, especially professional and managerial 
employees in the private sector, were often ‘award free’. This group constituted about 20 
percent of employees even at the apex of system’s reach in the mid-1980s. More 
significantly, the system only imperfectly engaged with the changing nature of work and 
workers after the 1960s. While the system was one of the best in the world for addressing 
gender wage discrimination in hourly rates, the great bulk of increased female employment 
increasingly took the form of part time work in services that was deemed ‘casual’. Such 
workers had (and have) no leave, redundancy or unfair dismissal rights. The collapse of full 
time youth manual employment and its replacement with part-time service work was also 
usually deemed ‘casual’. As a result ‘casual employees’ in Australia went from a tiny 
proportion of the work force in early 1970s to accounting from one work in five from the 
early 1990s (Watson et al 2003: 67-71).  
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Upheavals in the world economy provided the initial impetus that ultimately resulted in the 
rise of the award system in the 1890s. Further (slow burn) economic upheavals from the 
late 1960s onwards triggered further pressure for change (Brenner 2006, Buchanan and 
Watson 2001). Initially these were met by changes within the existing framework. Prime 
among these were various, often quite successful, incomes policies. This dynamic changed 
in the mid-1980s. Australia’s external sector has always been dominated by bulk 
commodities – agricultural, mineral and energy resources. A glut of these on world markets 
in the mid-1980s precipitated a crash in Australia’s terms of trade. The value of the 
Australian dollar relative to the US dollr fell by 25 percent in six months in 1985. A response 
of some kind was needed. The crisis of the 1930s had triggered a deepening of the liberal 
collectivist settlement, primarily through a comprehensive program of post-war 
reconstruction (Macintyre 2015). The changes initiated in the 1980s broke with this 
trajectory. A comprehensive neoliberal program was embraced. Finance was ‘deregulated’, 
the dollar floated and tariffs steadily cut – all undertaken to increase ‘competitiveness’ by 
increasing ‘market disciplines’ across the economy (Pusey 1991). No attempt was made to 
engage with or contain the fragmentation of the workforce and labour standards underway 
since the 1960s. On the contrary, these policy changes accommodated and – most 
importantly - entrenched these problems thereby weakening the capacity of the system to 
redress fragmentation and the rising wage inequality associated with it.  
 
 
Following the crisis in the external sector in the mid-1980s the incomes policy partners – 
unions led by the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the Labor government – 
proposed a radically modified wages policy to respond to the new economic conditions 
18 
 
(Briggs 2001). In doing so they adopted a tacit alliance with the Business Council of 
Australia, a new employer association representing large corporations, who wanted to be 
free of multi-employer bargaining (O’Brien 1994). The new order was codified in the 
Industrial Relations Reform Act of 1993, which ended a system that generalised the gains of 
collective bargaining through awards. This Act defined two distinct streams for setting 
standards: a bargaining stream and an award safety net. It was assumed that in time most 
employees would be governed by agreements. New legal rights to strike and to lock out (at 
enterprise level alone) were granted, as were new unfair dismissal rights for individual 
employees. In recognition that less than 30 per cent of the private sector workforce was 
unionised, an option for non-union collective agreements was created. Union and non-
union collective agreements could only be registered where it was clear workers were ‘not 
disadvantaged’ relative to the relevant award. It was assumed agreements would improve 
on the award, with the gains justified by more productive work, although this assumption 
was challenged from the beginning (Hancock and Rawson 1993). Macroeconomic balance 
was to be achieved by retarding wages growth in the award sector. This marked a profound 
shift in the notion of fairness at work. Whereas previously awards had worked to spread the 
gains of the strong to the weak (Hughes 1973), now they were explicitly prohibited from 
doing so. The core features of this system were maintained by the incoming conservative  
Coalition government (comprising the Liberal Party and the National Party and led by Prime 
Minister John Howard), elected in 1996. Its Workplace Relations Act of 1996 introduced 
statutory individual contracts (Australian Workplace Agreements or AWAs), but these too 
had to pass the ‘no disadvantage test’. This Act also limited the subject matter of awards 
and put major constraints on unions’ right of entry to the workplace. These matters, making 
life very difficult for unions, built on the defining features of the 1993 Act. 
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In 2004 the then Federal Government launched the radical Work Choice’ labour law 
reforms. Work Choices essentially centralised, shrank and tilted Australian labour law (Briggs 
2005; Briggs and Buchanan 2005). Centralisation involved increasing the power of the 
federal minister for labour to directly regulate industrial relations and undermined the 
discretionary authority of the federal industrial tribunal (Cooper and Ellem 2008: 545). Its 
arbitral powers were all but eradicated and its capacity to conciliate undermined by the 
promotion of private mediation and litigation through the general courts. Shrinking the 
reach of labour law involved, inter alia, removing pay scales from awards and specifying only 
five core labour standards by legislation (Fenwick 2006).iv This meant agreements (both 
collective and individual) could be settled below award standards (Evesson et al. 2007). The 
tilting of labour law essentially involved removing constraints on management and adding 
significantly to the constraints on unions. Changes of this nature included allowing 
employers to unilaterally issue ‘greenfield agreements’ for new worksites, establishing 
onerous procedural requirements before industrial action could be taken; and empowering 
employers to ignore unions completely, even where the majority of workers desired a union 
negotiated agreement.  
 
Following immense community opposition, the reforms were partially reversed in May 
2007, six months before the impending Federal election. Awards were partially restored as a 
reference point for agreement making. However, the concessions were not enough to 
prevent defeat for the conservative Liberal/National Coalition government following an 
intense election period in which the ACTU's ‘Your Rights at Work’ campaign played a crucial 
role (Ellem 2013; Wilson and Spies-Butcher 2011). The new Labor Government took office in 
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November 2007 on a policy that included abolition of AWAs (i.e. statutory individual 
contracts), restoration of unfair dismissal rights for most employees and restoration of 
awards, especially protections for financial compensation for working anti-social hours or 
overtime. The policy retained the primacy of enterprise bargaining and, most significantly, a 
number of Howard-era changes, including tight restrictions on union campaigning capacity, 
constraints on award content and prohibitions on pattern bargaining (Rudd and Gillard 
2007a). The objective for Labor was not restoring the old order but ‘getting the balance 
right’ in the new (Rudd and Gillard 2007b: 2). 
 
The end point: revitalised (but residualised) awards, politicised collective bargaining 
The endurance of awards is perhaps the most remarkable feature of the current system but 
they are no longer the vehicle for spreading wage gains from the strong to the weak. One of 
the first initiatives of the newly elected Labor administration in 2008 was to direct the then 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) to rationalise over 6000 different federal 
and state awards, covering an intersecting array of industries, occupations and enterprises, 
into 122 modern awards covering broad occupational or industry categories. Modern 
awards commenced operation on 1 January 2010. 
 
Prior to 1996 awards dealt with an ever-expanding range of work-related issues and 
provided a framework of inter-linked, quasi-universal labour standards covering most 
employees. Their content and labour market reach increased as the realm of collective 
bargaining and industrial disputes expanded. Now the content of modern awards is 
restricted to 20 allowable matters and they are explicitly framed to support those who are 
not covered by an enterprise agreement. Whereas agreements struck between employers 
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and workers used to drive the expansion of award standards, thereby ensuring eventually 
the gains of the strong flowed through to the weak, now awards provide a ‘back stop’ 
preventing agreements undermining labour standards. In addition, there are now 
exemptions from award coverage: all employees earning more than $100,000 in 2007 (at 
that stage around 160 per cent of average weekly earnings), leaving employers free to 
negotiate around all entitlements that are not directly enshrined in legislation. The Labor 
government also ensured award modernisation did not expand award coverage into 
occupations and industries that had historically been award-free (for example, managerial 
employees and workers in the public relations and real estate industries). These policy 
decisions perhaps more than any others confirmed that while there is bipartisan support for 
awards they now operate as residual, not universal, protections.  
 
 
The main initiative in the Fair Work Act to improve parties' access to bargaining concerned a 
new requirement for all parties to negotiate ‘in good faith’.  The onset of enterprise 
bargaining in 1993 had removed tribunals’ power to compulsorily settle disputes by 
arbitration. This enabled militant employers in strong bargaining positions to ignore union 
efforts to negotiate agreements, even when they enjoyed majority support at a workplace. 
The new requirement to ‘bargain in good faith’ was designed to overcome this outcome by 
requiring each party to share information and respond to claims put to it.  It has not led to 
an expansion in collective bargaining coverage, largely because these provisions are built 
around procedural steps instead of any consideration of content (Dorsett and Lafferty 
2010). As long as employers comply with purely procedural requirements there is no 
obligation to reach agreement. Moreover, the Labor Government continued to provide a 
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supportive framework for non-union collective agreements, honouring its commitment to 
the principle: a ‘union does not have an automatic right to be involved in collective 
enterprise bargaining’ (Rudd and Gillard 2007b: 13). Compared to the Work Choices regime 
unions do have some more collective bargaining rights but their role remains very 
circumscribed (Forsyth 2009). 
 
The other Fair Work Act initiative directed at improving equity was a provision permitting 
multi-employer bargaining for ‘low paid’ workers. Like the good faith provisions, this ‘low 
pay bargaining stream’ is supported by purely procedural rights that have had, to date, little 
substantive impact (Naughton 2011). New standards have been established, although not 
through industrial processes but primarily with political mobilisation. At a national level, 
three significant sectoral level industrial campaigns have occurred since 2007: a pay equity 
case leading to higher wages for the predominantly female social and community services 
workforce; the introduction of quality standards for the early childhood education and care 
workforce; and a new tribunal to address safety and remuneration concerns for truck 
drivers in the road freight transport industry (since abolished). The success of the 
campaigns, led by the Australian Services Union, United Voice, and the Transport Workers 
Union respectively, all hinged on being able to mobilise public opinion to achieve 
government support for the change, rather than the traditional strategy of petitioning a 
claim directly in the industrial tribunal.  
 
The success of campaigns such as these depends on creating new bonds of solidarity 
between workers and clients or customers, and between workers and the general public 
(Buchanan, Oliver and Briggs 2014). But these bonds are tenuous and require constant 
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political mobilisation with all the risks that this entails. This is in striking contrast to the 
labour standards regime that operated up until the early 1990s, when union recognition was 
axiomatic: conciliation and arbitration required unions for effective operation (Smith 1975). 
Union recognition is now, as a matter of substance, highly contingent. Where employers are 
opposed to unions, as long as they comply with requirements to ‘bargain in good faith’ they 
can stonewall union initiatives. Under these conditions unions have been forced in a 
number of instances into constant struggle to win effective recognition and the struggles are 
more frequently politicised with very publicly visible ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Consequently, 
although the elements of the old conciliation and arbitration system remain as a matter of 
form – awards, unions, tribunals and employers – they are now arrayed very differently. 
 
 
 
Discussion: Institutional plasticity entrenching (not redressing) deepening inequality 
All four modes of institutional change as identified by Thelen (2009: 489) have been at work 
in the modernisation of Australia’s labour standards – although to very differing degrees 
and rarely in isolation. 
 
Prima facie the least effective mode has been displacement (or what Hall and Thelen (2009) 
refer to as reform). This was most conspicuously attempted with the Work Choices 
initiatives of 2004 and 2007. This generated considerable political controversy (to the point 
of precipitating a change of Federal Government). While formally abandoned, profound 
institutional change of the type envisaged by the legislation had preceded it and continued 
after its repeal.  
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More enduring change has been achieved by layering and drift that has been consolidated 
by dynamics of plasticity (or what Thelen calls conversion). Arguably the most enduring, 
explicitly formulated change has involved institutional layering associated with enterprise 
bargaining (Thelen 2009: 489). Indeed, it can be understood as multiple institutional 
layering, since the introduction of enterprise bargaining was followed by statutory individual 
agreement forms (beginning with AWAs in 1996 and various iterations since). In one sense 
the impact of institutional layering was limited because, apart from a brief period under 
Work Choices, awards remained the reference point for determining whether an agreement 
was fair or reasonable (or ‘not disadvantageous’) for employees. From an international 
perspective, however, the privileging of this level of bargaining is what marks the Australian 
changes as instructive for future trends in wage inequality (Bosch 2015a; Hayter and 
Weinberg 2011). Enterprise bargaining delivers wage increases for employees covered by 
agreements (and probably reduces wage dispersion for these employees) but, as in the US, 
has no impact on wage dispersion in the non-collective bargaining sector. Fair Work Act era 
changes, particularly the low-pay bargaining stream (a rare exemption to the prohibition on 
multi-employer bargaining) are unlikely to change this because by design they are isolated 
from those sectors with sufficient union power to produce strong bargaining outcomes. 
 
Just as, if not more significant, than layering has been the long term problem of institutional 
drift. The key development here has been the erosion of award coverage – especially the 
declining reach of full award entitlements to growing numbers of workers since the late 
1970s. For the last three decades there has been both a sort of defection by default (Hall 
and Thelen 2009) as well as institutional drift (Thelen 2009) supported by the dynamics of 
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reinterpretation. The defection by default arose through the growth of occupational 
categories (particularly managerial and professional occupations) that were new or which 
had never been within award coverage. The ability to easily sidestep key parts of the award 
system suited service sector employers, whose particular demands for more flexible labour 
and more general skills were not well matched to how the award system and other 
associated institutions (such as traditional apprenticeships) defined and protected labour 
standards (Thelen 2014: 26). The reinterpretation arose through the explosion in casual 
employment, which while intended to apply only to cases where the work was irregular or 
sporadic became a widely-used loophole for employers seeking to avoid a range of 
entitlements and obligations owed to permanent full-time and part-time workers (Watson 
et al 2003: Chapter 3). Consequently, the award system became less relevant to large 
proportions of the top and bottom of the wage earning distribution. Both developments 
arose because of changes in the underlying labour market, which accelerated as Australia 
transitioned to a more open economy. Neither of these developments were caused by any 
change in the structure or purpose of the award system or Australia’s industrial relations 
institutions in general, although the failure of the award system to respond is itself telling. 
There are echoes here of the struggle to maintain Germany’s collective bargaining system 
(Bosch 2015b) and to maintain social solidarity in the Swedish model (Thelen 2014). 
 
 
While layering and drift have been important, arguably the most significant aspect of 
institutional change has been the plasticity of the award system itself with the role it now 
plays being profoundly converted in a host of subtle ways. On the surface, the Fair Work Act 
entrenched and revitalised the award system as the cornerstone of labour market 
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regulation. Yet the continued resilience of the award system is not evidence that Australia 
has halted the drift to liberalisation. Following Baccaro and Howell (2011), the award system 
meant that Australia began its journey of labour market liberalisation from a different 
starting point to other jurisdictions. Previously awards contributed to a more equal 
distribution of incomes than was the case in other comparable Anglo liberal economies, and 
this persisted for longer.   This contrast holds even for some European countries with stronger 
collective bargaining systems. For example, provisions in Germany (in the Collective Bargaining Act 
and the Posted Workers Act) permit the extension of wage rates to workplaces beyond those 
covered by the original agreement but, prior to reforms in 2014, use of the provisions had been in 
decline and they were prominent only in construction and some other industries (Schulten and 
Bispinck 2015: 248). Moreover, the German extension provisions apply only minimum rates (for 
skilled and unskilled workers), not the full wage grid from collective agreements (Grimshaw, Bosch 
and Rubery 2014: 482), whereas modern awards retain multiple classifications and wage points.   
However the substantive role of awards in shaping pay outcomes has mutated through a 
range of reinterpretations, including through  lower percentage award wage rate increases 
for trade- and university qualified workers in comparison to minimum wage earners, 
resulting in a compression of award wage rate relativities (Healy 2011; Buchanan, Oliver and 
Briggs 2014: 3-2); the lack of objective criteria (such as qualifications) in classification 
definitions (Oliver and Walpole 2015); and the resulting tendency of employers to place 
employees on the lowest possible classification (Wright and Buchanan 2013: 67). As a result 
award wage rates have become less meaningful as an instrument of comparative wage 
justice (Buchanan, Bretherton, et al 2013). This situation contrasts most markedly with 
France where, in spite of low union density, high collective bargaining coverage means that 
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minimum wage rates are reproduced in the entire collective bargaining wage grid such that 
relativities are maintained over time (Grimshaw, Bosch and Rubery 2014). 
 
 In addition to mutation, further changes have been promoted with the expansion of opting 
out provisions. The current conservative government is undertaking a number of minor 
changes that will retain the Fair Work architecture while allowing employers to erode award 
standards relating to hours, overtime and penalty rate provisions by making it easier to 
settle ‘Individual flexibility agreements’ (a device already within Labor’s Fair Work Act) that 
undercut the relevant award or collective agreement (Buchanan and Oliver 2013). The 
cumulative impact of all the above has been to change the relevance and reach of awards. 
Previously they could legitimately have been regarded as extensions of collective 
agreements. This is no longer the case. The current state of awards means that their 
standards have continued to erode over time. Increasingly, award-covered workers are 
coming to resemble what other countries call ‘minimum wage’ workers rather than those 
covered by collective bargaining agreements. Because most award rates (other than the 
very lowest classifications) have not kept pace with inflation, continuing wage compression 
in awards will have flow on consequences to collective bargaining outcomes in low-wage, 
low union density sectors such as retail. Recent survey evidence (Wright and Buchanan 
2013) suggests for example that (compressed) pay relativities in awards covering low wage 
workers are replicated in collective agreements in award-reliant sectors such as grocery 
retailing (Buchanan, Bretherton, et al. 2013:69 - 81). In short these are best seen as ‘award 
reliant agreements’ – not agreements that set new wage standards. This is a complete 
inversion of the earlier industrial order where agreements used to set (rising) wage 
standards that then prevailed in awards. 
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Conclusion 
Amid a growing interest in wage inequality, the transformation of the Australian award 
system of wage determination and the introduction of firm-level enterprise bargaining 
illustrates the importance of better understanding the role played by changes in wage-
setting institutions on wage outcomes. Since Australia adopted formal enterprise bargaining 
in 1993, it has experienced among the largest growth in wage inequality internationally. 
Establishing a causal relationship is difficult but the Australian experience analysed in this 
article is consistent with extant comparative research demonstrating that lowering the level 
of bargaining is associated with an increase in wage inequality.  
 
These changes are not solely the outcome of changes in wage determination. The ‘great 
compression’ from the 1940s to the mid-1970s was a legacy of the ‘new protection’ 
settlement augmented by a comprehensive program of post-second world war 
reconstruction. The approach to wage determination in this regime – one which helped 
ensure the gains of the strong were shared with the weak – worked well nested within such 
a liberal collectivist settlement. The key elements of that settlement have long been 
displaced. Where Australia’s new ‘modernised’ wage determination arrangements are 
important is in what they tacitly support and actively prevent. The current policy approach 
of severing links between the strong and the weak simply does not engage with problems of 
labour market fragmentation that have been gradually intensifying since the 1960s. On the 
contrary, they entrench it by limiting the capacity of agents like unions and agencies like the 
Fair Work Commission to doing anything systemic to redress them.  
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The Australian example provides additional evidence of the impact and durability of 
different modes of institutional change. Four different modes of such change have been 
considered. Reform directed at explicitly displacing the older order has been the least 
effective mode. This does not mean that what Work Choices aspired to achieve has not 
come to pass. Both drift and layering have contributed to supporting growing wage 
dispersion, but have left in place the core of the old system, even if it now operates on a 
residualised and not inclusive basis. Conversion (especially reinterpretation or mutation of 
awards and agreements), on the other hand, has been more intrusive. As a result the 
relationship between awards and agreements has been inverted. Previously the system 
transmitted the gains of collective agreements of the strong to the weak through awards. 
Now awards work to define how low agreements can go. Allied labour laws severely 
constrain the ability of either agreements or awards to engage with new issues or new 
classes of work and workers as they emerge.  
 
It is important that we absorb these lessons as interest in wage inequality rises in places like 
the OECD, World Bank and IMF. Neoliberalism with a human face is part of the problem, not 
part of the solution. Effective responses to the problem of deepening wage inequality need 
more effective specification of objectives, understanding of the issues and new institutional 
capabilities. Ironically, survivals of the old liberal collectivist order provide a better 
foundation for this than anything left by the neoliberal turn in policy. But legacy foundations 
are limited in what they offer. The challenge is not to go back to some mythical ‘golden age’. 
Instead dramatic reconstruction and capacity building are needed within the state and 
beyond (e.g. Buchanan, Dymski, et al. 2013b and Schmid 2014) if fair work is become the 
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substantive – and not merely discursive - hall mark of the Australian labour market in the 
future. 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1: Proportion of workers who are low-wage (less than two thirds of median 
income), 1993-2013 
 
Source: OECD (2016) Wage levels (indicator). doi: 10.1787/0a1c27bc-en (Accessed on 29 
February 2016)  
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Figure 2: Ratio of 5th decile to 1st earnings decile, 1993-2013 
 
Source: OECD (2016) Wage levels (indicator). doi: 10.1787/0a1c27bc-en (Accessed on 29 
February 2016)  
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Figure 3: Incidence of low pay workers and 50/10 ratio by collective bargaining coverage, 
2013 
 
Sources: OECD (2016), ILO (2016), Eurostat (2013). 
Note: Size of bubble reflects ratio of 5/1 earnings deciles. Graph excludes Korea due to substantial 
overlap with US. Notes to Table 1 also applicable.  
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Endnotes 
i Particularly rigorous formulations of the dynamics involved here are provided in Botwinick (1994) and 
Marsden (1987). 
ii Picketty’s analysis is not crafted on a rhetorical rejection of the ‘first year text book’ version of orthodox 
marginalism. In addition to Picketty (2014: especially 310-313), see Picketty (2015), his response to Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2015). 
iii However DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) found changes in the US minimum wage to account for a larger 
share of the change in wage dispersion than a change in unionisation. 
iv These were: respecting the relevant hourly rate of pay derived from the relevant award; a standard working 
week of 38 hours, but people could work longer if they so chose (but with no obligation for additional 
compensation for over time or anti social hours of work); up to 12 months unpaid parental leave; 10 days sick 
leave/carers leave a year (but which could be cashed out); and four weeks annual leave (two weeks of which 
could be cashed out). 
                                                          
